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The results stated in table 4 indicate that the strategic alliances that  can be characterized by 
the Cooperation model actually have the highest degree of cooperation, whereas the 
   
 
Supremacy model has the lowest degree. This is astonishing as the results from the interviews 
of the managing directors of the strategic alliances suggested quite the opposite. An 
explanation of the difference can be found in the differences in focus of the strategic 
alliances. The Cooperation model focusses on the reinforcement of the market position of the 
individual retailer. The service package they offer is based on this focus. The retailers within 
the Cooperative model hold the same opinion about the focus of their strategic alliance. There 
is no divergence on the strategic market orientation between the managing directors of the 
Cooperation model and their members. In the case of the Supremacy model there is a certain 
divergence between the managing directors and the retail members. They both have a 
different opinion about the strategic goals of the alliance. The managing directors are 
concerned about the market position of the strategic alliance as a whole, and think that the 
individual market position of their members is of a minor importance. They think that a good 
market position of the alliance implicates a good market position for the retail members. The 
Supremacy model is focussing on a collective marketing strategy. The problem within the 
Supremacy model is that a large part of the retailers do not agree with this strategy. The 
divergent opinions about the strategic orientation of the strategic alliance causes problems of 
cooperation. The managing directors of the alliance could try to force the retail members to 
cooperate. This however may lead to an exodus of retailers who probably will join another 
(competing) strategic alliance. 
An illustration of the difference in cooperation between the two most opposite models of 
strategic alliances can be found in the collective advertising: within the Supremacy model 
every member will have the same campaign, while in the Cooperation model every member 
will have the same brochure. It may be easier to join a cooperate activity when being a 
member of a strategic alliance of the Cooperative model. 
 
In order to get some more insight in the degree of cooperation a factor analysis is conducted 
on the service package of the strategic alliances. Factor analysis gives the opportunity to 
determine the basic elements for cooperation. An overview of the results from the factor 
analysis on the service package is given in table 5. 
 
Table 5: Factor analysis on the service usage of the strategic alliances 
   (loadings on PCA-varimax rotated factors) 
 
 variables  factor 1  factor 2   factor 3  factor 4 
- assortment/selection of articles   0,82    
- central payment  0,70    
- collective advertising  0,69    
- order bundling/central buying  0,65    (0,58) 
- advise on automation   0,76   
- advise on business economics   0,66   
- legal advise   0,57  (0,55)  
- use of private label    0,73  
- stock keeping/warehousing  (0,51)   0,69  
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- presentation/interior decoration     0,88 
 
R² total 69,4%  
    
 
The four factor solution explains 69,4% of the total variance. Factor 1 can be interpreted as 
the traditional collective buying and selling function of the cooperation: all four high loading 
variables express this traditional function. Originally the strategic alliances in the mens wear 
business were founded in order to give the retailers support on the buying function. Soon their 
after the strategic alliances started to develop collective advertising campaigns for their 
members. Factor 2 represents the advice function of the strategic alliances. Factor 3 expresses 
the usage of private labels. Shop presentation and interior decoration form the last factor (4). 
The four factors represent the basic entrepreneurial support functions of the strategic alliances 
in relation to their members.  By computing the factor scores of the three types of strategic 
alliances it is possible to compare them. The results of this analysis are presented in table 6. 
 




 types of strategic alliances 
  Cooperation  Coordination  Supremacy  F-value 
 (2,224 df) 
Traditional buying/selling function   0,18   0,06  -0,20  2,42 * 
Advice function   0,47  -0,30   0,16  12,45 ** 
Private label   0,01   0,21  -0,32  6,27 ** 
Interior decoration  -0,40  -0,02   0,28  6,78 ** 
 
legend: ** á-value <.05; * á-value <.10 
 
The results from table 6 indicate that the Cooperation model can be characterized by a higher 
than average cooperation on the traditional buying and selling function and the advice 
function. A lower than average cooperation is found on the shop presentation and interior 
decoration function.  
The cooperation within the Coordination model can be characterized by a lower than average 
cooperation on the advice function and higher than average on the private label support. The 
cooperation within the Supremacy model can be characterized by a higher than average 
cooperation on the interior decoration and advice function, but a lower than average 
cooperation on the traditional buying and selling functions and private label support. 
The profile of the retailers within the Cooperation model is in harmony with the results from 
the interviews with the managing directors of the strategic alliances. The same conclusion 
goes for the Coordination model. But within the Supremacy model one would aspect a higher 
score on the private label operations, as well as on the traditional buying function. It may well 
be that the character of a free entrepreneur and a network that tries to prescribe these 
entrepreneurs a shop-formula leads to conflicting ideas and a reluctance to cooperate on all 
aspects. 






3.3. Differences in performance 
 
The performance of a strategic alliance can be expressed by means of a number of qualitative 
and quantitative measures. Both types of measurements will be discussed in this section. At 
first  qualitative aspects and then the quantitative performance differences will be discussed. 
 
Qualitative performance indicators 
The qualitative measures give an indication of the level of professionalism within the strategic 
alliance. The qualitative performance includes: 
- the degree of automation; 
- the availability of in- and external information; 
- the service level. 
Table 7 gives an overview of the results of the three types of strategic alliances on these 
qualitative performance measures. ANOVA is used to analyze the differences between the 
three types of strategic alliances. 
 
Table 7: differences in performance indicators of the three different types of strategic 





  Strategic Alliance sign 
F-test 
  Cooperation  Coordination  Supremacy  
- degree of automation  64%  40%  51%  ** 
- availability of internal and 
external information 
20% has a lot of 
information 
available, 80% little 
19% has a lot of 
information 
available, 81% little 
38% has a lot of 
information availa-
ble, 62% little 
 * 
- the service level 66% has a high 
service performance, 
34% a low 
performance 
51% has a high 
service performance, 
49% a low 
performance 
62% has a high 
service 
performance, 38% 
a low performance 
 no 
 
legend: ** á-value <.05; * á-value <.10 
 
From table 7 we may conclude that the retailers in the Cooperation model are performing 
better as far as the degree of automation is concerned. An explanation for this is the high 
degree of cooperation on this aspect within the Cooperation model (see table 4). The retailers 
from the Supremacy model have more internal and external information available, that can be 
explained by the high level of information gathering and information distribution within the 
Supremacy model. 
 
Quantitative performances measures 
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The quantitative performance measures can be divided into two categories, namely the 
measures that give an impression of the (average) productivity of the strategic alliance and the 
measures that give an impression of the (average) profitability. In order to obtain this 
information the complete financial administration, the yearbooks, the profit and loss state etc., 
as controlled by the accountant, was used to derive the necessary performance measures. An 
overview of the performances of the retailers from the three different types of strategic 
alliances is given in table 8. The differences are again tested by using analysis of variance 
(ANOVA). 
 
Table 8: Differences in performance of the three types of strategic alliances: productivity 
and profitability (n =227) 
 
 
 performance measure 
 Type of strategic alliance sign 
F. 
  Cooperation  Coordination  Supremacy  
 Productivity     
- turnover per full-time equivalent  ƒ 303.146  ƒ 272.213  ƒ 271.819  ** 
- turnover per labour hour  ƒ 187  ƒ 127  ƒ 133  ** 
- turnover per m2 selling space  ƒ 6.923  ƒ 5.837  ƒ 5.439  ** 
- turnover per m2 shop space  ƒ 5.030  ƒ 4.181  ƒ 4.050  ** 
- speed of turnover  3,3  3,5  3  no 
- average turnover per outlet  ƒ  1.612.491   ƒ 931.674  ƒ 913.989  ** 
 Profitability     
- gross profit  ƒ 686.334  ƒ 374.786  ƒ 367.485  ** 
- gross profit margin  41,5%  39,8%  39,7%  ** 
- gross profit per m² selling space  ƒ 2.866  ƒ 2.321  ƒ 2.172  ** 
- gross profit per full-time equivalent  ƒ 121.260  ƒ 107.329  ƒ 108.314  ** 
- gross profit per labour hour  ƒ 76  ƒ 51  ƒ 54  ** 
 
legend: ƒ = Dutch guilder   ** : p of F-value <.05 
 
The results from table 8 indicate that the average productivity and the average profitability, as 
expressed in different measures, of the retailers within the Cooperation model is significantly 
higher: they have a significantly higher labour productivity, selling space productivity, labour 
profitability and selling space profitability. This indicates a more efficient way of running the 
enterprise. The significantly higher turnover, gross profit and gross profit margin of the 
retailers within the Cooperation model indicates a better performance on the buying and 
selling activities.  
The other two strategic alliances do not differ very much from one another.  
 
The first impression is that the strategic alliances that can be characterized by the Cooperation 
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model have a higher degree of cooperation, and do a much better job than the other two types 
of strategic alliances. 
In order to get some more insight in the reasons why the strategic alliances with the highest 
performance are characterized by a higher degree of cooperation, we will first compare the 
members of the different types of strategic alliances on their organizational characteristics. 
3.4. Organizational characteristics of the strategic alliances 
 
Information on organizational characteristics from each of the retailers was collected. It 
includes labour force characteristics, investment variables and commercial information.  
An overview of these different organizational characteristics is given in table 9.  
 
Table 9: Organizational characteristics: a comparison between types of strategic alliances 
 
 
 organizational characteristics  
 types of strategic alliances 
  Cooperation  Coordination  Supremacy  sign 
 labour force variables     
-number of owners/directors  1,4  1,3  1,3  no 
- number of full-timers   4,4  2,3  1,9  * 
- total number of labour hours per week  183,2  145,6  129,7  ** 
- total number of labour hours per staff 
member per week 
 19,3  17,3  17,5  * 
 investment variables     
- average investments in the retail outlet  ƒ 381.200  ƒ 64.750  ƒ 20.500  ** 
- average investment in automation  ƒ  5.262  ƒ 7.782  ƒ 6.302  no 
- number of retailers that invested in the 
store outlet 
 10,8%  22,0%  16,7%  no 
- number of retailers that invested in 
automation 
 19,6%  19,3%  20,8%  no 
 commercial variables     
- average advertising budget  ƒ 30.500  ƒ 24.582  ƒ 21.446  no 
- number of regular clients  2.485  1.800  1.269  * 
- average m² selling space  271 m²  200 m²   202 m²  no 
- top-3 brand share  34,7%  38,8%  37,5%  no 
- price level small confectionery  ƒ 260  ƒ 160  ƒ 159  ** 
- price level large confectionery  ƒ 560  ƒ 411  ƒ 402  ** 
- average age of the enterprise  40  44  40  no 
 
There are organizational differences between the three different types of strategic alliances. 
  1 
 
Especially the retailers from the cooperation model can be characterized as large in 
comparison with the retailers from the two other groups. They have a higher input of labour, 
higher investments, a larger customer base and a larger shop. The question arises to what 
degree the differences in performances, as found in table 8, are a function of the differences in 
organizational characteristics and entrepreneurial behavior or caused by differences in type of 
strategic alliance. 
 
3.5. Strategic alliances performance differences 
 
In order to estimate the influence of retail characteristics, entrepreneurial cooperative 
behavior and type of strategic alliance on the performance of the 227 retailers, regression 
analyses are used. The results of the regression analysis are presented in table 10. 
 
Table 10: Regression results on profit and turnover with retail characteristics, marketing 
factors, cooperative behavior and type of strategic alliance as predictors. 
 
 
 Independent Variables 
 Gross Profit  Gross Turnover 
 Coop Coord Supr Total Coop Coord Supr Total 
Total labour hours .16**  .78*** .34*** .20** .20** .79*** .32*** .25*** 
Price level small confectionery -.03 -.08 .07 -.05 -.05 -.04 .02 -.04 
Price level large confectionery .09 .14** .05 .08 .12 .10* .06 .08 
Advertising budget .33*** .00 .08 .23*** .37*** .01 .10 .23*** 
Store size .70*** .16** .66*** .57*** .64*** .17** .70*** .56*** 
'Top 3 brand'- share .10 -.06 -.03 -.00 .09 -.04 -.02 .01 
Total average investment -.12 .01 .03 -.03 -.07 .00 .01 -.01 
Collective buying -.02 -.03 .01 -.00 .00 -.05 .04 -.01 
Advice .00 .07 -.08 .05 .03 .05 -.10 .05 
Private label -.09 .10** .10 .01 -.06 .06 .15** .02 
Interior decoration .03 -.02 -.03 -.01 .07 -.04 -.02 -.01 
D1=Coop    .12**    .10** 
D2=Coord    -.03    -.03 
R2 .86 .85 .75 .67 .83 .87 .76 .70 
N  46  109  72  227  46  109  72  227 
*   Standardized â weight p-value < 0.10 
**  Standardized â weight p-value < 0.05 
*** Standardized â weight p-value < 0.01 
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In table 10 the results of 8 regression analyses are given. For each of the three types of 
strategic alliances separately a regression analysis of retail characteristics on gross profit and 
on gross turnover is performed. Also the results from regression analyses for all retailers 
together on profit and turnover is given. The first column of table 10 gives the independent 
variables, the predictors, for the regression analyses. They include: size of labour force, price 
level for the two main components of the mens wear assortment: small and large 
confectionery, the advertising budget, store size, the total year investment as well as the 
assortment type as expressed in the 'top 3 brand'-share. This share expresses the degree in 
which the assortment is focussed on just a few brands or has a more diverse composition. 
These retail characteristics include the production factors: store, labour and investments as 
well as the marketing mix elements: price, advertising and assortment. Two dummy variables 
D1 and D2 are included in the overall analyses: D1 =1 for the cooperative retailers, D2 =1 for 
the coordination retailers and both D1 and D2 are zero for the supremacy retailers. (Including 
D3 =1 for supremacy would lead to an overdetermined correlation matrix). 
The four behavioral cooperation factors are also included. 
Each of the other columns presents the standardized â-weights of the independent variables 
in explaining gross profit and gross turnover. The results show that between 75 and 87 % of 
the variance in profit and turnover can be explained by the predictor variables. Not included 
factors such as location of the store, the person of the owner, earlier investments etc. could 
have added to the explained variance. Size of the store and labour input explain most of the 
variance in both profit and turnover. For the retailers from a coordination network labour 
input explains more than store size the performance. For the other retailers store size is the 
most important production factor. Price level has only for large confectionery a small, not 
really significant, positive effect on profit and turnover. Assortment differences show no 
effect. Advertising has an overall positive effect on profit and turnover mainly due to the 
cooperation retailers. May be that their somewhat higher advertising expenditures exceed a 
minimal level above which its effect becomes visible. Investments do not immediately pay 
off: only a slight negative effect on profit for the higher investing cooperation retailers (-.12) 
is found. The difference, both in profit and turnover, between the cooperation retailer and the 
others, D1, is significant. So, apart from all the other production factors and marketing mix 
variables, being a member of a cooperative strategic alliance effects both turnover and profit 
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